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Abstract
In this study, patentability of the human embryonic stem cell lines has discussed 
in the legal and ethical perspectives. In vitro human embryonic stem cells can be 
defined as body parts that are departed from the body. Human embryonic stem cell 
lines are constituted of differentiated self-renewal pluripotent stem cells, which 
means they have no characteristics to become a human-being. However, interpret-
ing the terms like human embryo and right to property widely can cause the human 
embryonic stem cell lines are misunderstood as unpatentable. For our point of view, 
giving the human embryo the protections of both personal rights of the donor and 
the right to property of the owner of the invention does not reduce the legal/moral 
status of the human embryo. Besides, the obligations which these rights imposes to 
their owners, such as the principle of human dignity and prohibition of financial 
gain can protect the human embryo in a better way.
Keywords: human embryonic stem cell lines, patentability, human dignity, personal 
rights, right to property, prohibition of financial gain, law, ethics
1. Introduction
Human embryonic stem cell researches (HESCRs) has been widely discussed 
in different perspectives. In this chapter, the issue will be considered from the 
perspective of the patentability of the human embryonic stem cell lines (HESCLs). 
Embryonic stem cells are derived from the inner cell mass of an embryo in the 
blastocyst stage. Embryonic stem cells are “pluripotent” cells, which means, they 
are, technically, differentiable into a wide range of cell and tissue types [1]. The 
researches on human embryonic stem cells have the potential to discover and 
develop treatments for a variety of diseases including Alzheimer’s disease, diabetes, 
neurodegenerative disorders, heart diseases, Parkinson’s disease, or anemia [1, 2]. 
HESCLs make scientific researches and stem cell treatments possible by producing 
differentiated self-renewal pluripotent stem cells. However, conflicts of interest 
arise between patients seeking treatment and human embryos from the fact that, 
while harvesting HESCs, the human embryo is destroyed.
The subject of patentability of the HESCLs has also been discussed because 
of the legal prohibition of financial gain on the human body and its parts and the 
principle of human dignity [3]. It is not possible to accept human embryo and 
HESCLs as a property that is suitable for industrial applicability when the concepts 
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are regarded with their traditional definitions. The principle of human dignity 
and the prohibition of financial gain on the human body and its parts prevent such 
acceptance. However, the human embryo and the stem cells derived from it have 
a sui generis legal and moral status. Besides, in the patentability of the HESCLs 
issue, the patentable thing is not the human embryo itself, but the pluripotent cell 
lines differentiated into self-renewal pluripotent stem cells and the method of the 
process.
In the first part of this chapter, the sui generis legal status of the human embryo 
will be discussed by interpreting the legal status of the human body parts. In the 
second part, conditions of patentability will be analyzed from the perspective of the 
patentability of the HESCLs. Finally, in the third part of this chapter, the patentability 
of the HESCLs will be viewed in the moral and ethical aspects.
2. Legal status of the human embryo
It is possible to make an interpretation based on the legal status of the human 
body parts to understand the legal status of the in vitro human embryonic stem 
cells. Such an interpretation needs a few definitions and premises:
1. We can define human body parts as the body parts of a person.
2. Human body parts can be divided into two such as inter-body parts (which 
are in a unity with the body) and the body parts that are departed from the 
body [4].
3. It is possible to divide human cells into two such as somatic cells and germ cells.
4. A human embryo is a being that is composed of germ cells of women (OVAs) 
and men (sperms).
5. A human embryo can be in vivo (in the body of the pregnant woman) or in 
vitro (in the outside of a woman’s body, probably in a Petri tube).
6. Human embryonic stem cells are derived from the inner cell mass of an  
embryo in the blastocysts stage [1].
7. Embryonic stem cells are “pluripotent” cells, which means, they are, techni-
cally, differentiable into a wide range of cell and tissue types [1]. However, they 
are not “totipotent” cells. A basic meaning of this fact is: they cannot differ-
entiate into a human embryo; they can only differentiate into specific types of 
cells and tissues [5].
8. Since we agree with the general acceptance of the human embryo has no legal 
personality, we are in the view of human embryonic stem cells of an in vivo 
human embryo is within the body parts of the pregnant woman.
However, things are much more complicated in the subject of the in vitro embryo. 
Does it belong to the donor of the ova or the donor of the sperm or both of them? 
Does it belong to the patient of assisted reproduction treatment? What happens if it 
is donated for the researches? Does it belong to the researcher? What does “to belong 
to” mean for human body parts? Does it mean ownership? Is it possible to accept 
human body parts as properties?
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According to the traditional definition, the right to property is a right, which 
gives its owner the authority to use, to enjoy the fruits and the ownership. If one 
of these three authorities not legally enjoyable for a person, then that person 
has no right to property on that property or that thing is not subject to the right 
to property. Authority to ownership means legal availability to buy and sell. 
Authority to ownership is not enjoyable for body parts because the prohibition of 
financial gain on the human body and its parts is a fundamental principle, which 
is accepted worldwide in both international and domestic regulations. Article 21 
of the Convention on Human Rights and Biomedicine (CETS No. 164) with the 
title of “prohibition of financial gain” is a good example of such regulations by 
saying “The human body and its parts shall not, as such, give rise to financial gain” 
[6]. Another example is Article 3 of the European Union Charter of Fundamental 
Rights. According to the article with the title of “Right to the integrity of the 
person,”
1. “Everyone has the right to respect for his or her physical and mental integrity.
2. In the fields of medicine and biology, the following must be respected in particular:
• the free and informed consent of the person concerned, according to the  
procedures laid down by law,
• the prohibition of eugenic practices, in particular those aiming at the selection  
of persons,
• the prohibition on making the human body and its parts as such a source  
of financial gain,
• the prohibition of the reproductive cloning of human beings” [7].
Because of the prohibition of financial gain on the human body and its parts, 
according to the general view in the French, German and Turkish doctrine, germ 
cells that are departed from the body cannot be considered as property, and giving 
harm to these cells causes a violation of personal rights, not of the right to prop-
erty [4, 8–13]. While some of the authors claim that protecting human embryos 
is possible only with the personal rights of the donors [8–10] others emphasize its 
sui generis legal status [11–13].
As it is seen while the doctrine agrees with the view of human embryos have 
a sui generis legal status and can be protected with the donor’s personal rights, 
there is no unity in the view of it is also possible to protect the right to property 
to the human embryos. As we mentioned before, it is possible to make an inter-
pretation based on the legal status of the human body parts to understand the 
legal status of the in vitro human embryonic stem cells. Because human germ 
cells are about reproductive rights, more specific protection is provided for the 
germ cells than that of the somatic cells. Because the human embryo has char-
acteristics of both the donors’ and the embryo itself and also has the potential 
to develop into a living human, more specific protection is provided for in vivo 
human embryo (for example with abortion laws) than that of the germ cells. On 
the other hand, such a more specific protection is not provided to in vitro human 
embryo, although it has the same characteristics as in vivo human embryo. From 
our point of view, protecting it with the right to property besides the protec-
tion of personal rights can give the more specific protection the in vitro human 
embryo needs.
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3. The patentability of HESCLs from the legal aspect
A patent is a legal document, which provides a right to enjoy the innovation’s 
owner and prevent third parties from violating the rights of the owner. The owner 
of the patent has the opportunity to declare the rights related to the patent to 
third parties [14]. By giving patents, states aim to encourage scientists to make 
science. An innovation that is given patent improves the scientific development of 
societies by presenting the innovation to the memory of the society. States target 
community development by authorizing exclusive competence to the owner of the 
innovation [15].
Legislations which affect the patentability of HESCLs usually regulate the 
patentability of the biotechnological inventions field, in which the applications 
about the HESCLs take part. Unfortunately there is no legislation regulates the 
patentability of the HESCLs specificly. For this reason, rules for the patentability 
of the HESCLs are reachable by interpreting legislations on the biotechnological 
inventions. Therefore, in this part of the syudy, patentability criteria and interna-
tional regulations on the biotechnological inventions will be examined in the first 
two subtitles. Then, in the third subtitle of this part, patentability of the HESCLs 
will be specificly considered.
3.1  The relationship between biotechnological inventions and patentability 
criteria
Patents are qualified with three criteria. To an application is being patented, it 
has to be novel and inventive and have industrial applicability [16]. These criteria 
are also needed for the patent application in the field of biotechnology. However, 
because of the sui generis characteristics of biotechnological researches, some 
differences appear. In the paragraphs below, the affection of the sui generis charac-
teristics of the biotechnology field on the meaning of the patentability criteria will 
be explained.
Novelty, which is the first characteristic of patentability, means going beyond 
the state of art in the field of biotechnology [17]. To a research in biotechnology is 
beyond the state of art, it has to be about a technic that is more developed than the 
technic that was known before. It is not enough the research itself has the ethical 
values that are determined by the international organizations, the novel technic 
should also be compatible with these values. The qualification on the novelty in 
the field of Biotechnology is not far more different from the qualification on the 
novelty in the other fields. However, in the field of biotechnology, there has to be 
a specific qualification, since in these innovations the materials existed in nature 
are mentioned. The fact that proteins, genes, enzymes, and such materials are 
already existed in nature and in the researches such materials are processed, the 
characteristic of novelty does not appear traditionally. For this reason, in the field of 
biotechnology studying more on material or finding the different physical charac-
teristics and forms of the materials do not eliminate the innovations characteristic 
of novelty. Also the fact that its benefits are already known does not eliminate the 
characteristic of novelty [18]. However, if the subject of the patent application has 
the same technic with the technics that are already known, it is accepted that the 
application has not got the characteristic of novelty, without considering its produc-
tion method.
The second criteria for a patent application is its inventiveness. A patent appli-
cation should be inventive. In this context, firstly, the target of the application 
should be determined. If there is a determined target for the application and if 
this target is reachable with the estimated theory and the existing information for 
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the application, it is possible to say that there is an innovation. Another matter, 
which proves that there is an invention, is the application is capable of fulfilling the 
existing needs. Besides, there should be a reasonable expectation for the technic to 
be “obviously” successful, which means each time the technic has used the conse-
quences should be the same. No application that has obvious consequences can be 
patented [19].
PharmaStem v Viacell Case of United States District Court of Delaware is an 
example of the conflicts on inventiveness in Europe. The case is about an invention 
on an isolated DNA molecule, which codes human tissue plasminogen activator 
(t-PA). The court has decided that producing human t-PA by using human recom-
binant DNA technology is an obvious consequence for any expert in the field. The 
court says that, oligonucleotide probing was a known technic, any expert could 
reach the consequence of the invention that seeking for the protection of pat-
ent because choosing oligonucleotide probs did not need a high level of skill and 
experience. According to the court, the monopoly rights given to the patent owners 
provide much more than a prize given for winning the race of recombinant expres-
sion of the gene. For this reason, the court says that the invention seeking patent 
protection could not succeed in the criteria of inventiveness. It is seen that the court 
has emphasized the obviousness of the isolation methods of DNA, not the structure 
of the molecule, and reached the conclusion of the decision should be made by con-
sidering the creativity of the method, not by considering the speed of the method’s 
application [16, 20]. As is seen, the criteria of inventiveness qualified specially in 
biotechnological researches.
The last criteria for a patent application is industrial applicability. Determination 
of the industrial applicability can be hard for a biotechnological invention because, 
in general, it is not as clear as for an invention on a gene or a protein sequence, as 
for the inventions in other fields of science. For example, in genetic researches, 
short DNA sequences’ or expressed sequence tags are used as probs. However, some 
quarters claim that expressed sequence tags do not have enough benefits for patent-
ability [16].
A patent application, when it is considered with the knowledge that is widely 
known, should include a real industrial applicability expectation, instead of a com-
pletely theoretical probability of industrial applicability. Without a clear descrip-
tion related to its method or describing the method without pointing out one of its 
practical benefits, it is not enough for the industrial applicability criteria to succeed. 
It is also not enough to relate the structure to some reachable but undetermined 
theoretical aims for the industrial applicability criteria to succeed. However, having 
no experiment or laboratory data related to the method of the application seeking 
patent protection does not show that it is not reaching the industrial applicability 
criteria. Criteria of industrial applicability cannot be dependent on experiments or 
laboratory data. It is enough to give a reasonable and reliable benefit or estimated 
data. Reliability can be supported by the possible information that can appear later. 
Because laboratory reports, expert opinions, and clinical trials related to the inven-
tion increase the reliability of the applicability of the invention, they support the 
industrial applicability criteria indirectly [21].
It is possible having no industrial applicability criteria for one part of the 
invention to affect the industrial applicability criteria of its other part. For example, 
when a part of the invention is about receptor, if the receptor has no industrial 
applicability, the agonist (compounds forming reaction in the cell by connecting 
to the cell receptors) related to the receptor also have no industrial applicability. 
Likewise, a method, which defines an agonist related to a receptor, has no industrial 
applicability, either. On the other hand, it would not be possible to say that the 
receptor, agonists, and the method of defining the agonists do not have the criteria 
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of industrial applicability if, for example, it is clarified with some in vivo or in vitro 
data in the description that it is about the treatment of obesity [16]. To sum up, the 
situation of a part of the application is the lack of the criteria of industrial applica-
bility does not mean that the whole application is not patentable. Hence, the effect 
of technological developments on the criteria of industrial applicability increases in 
each passing day.
3.2 Patentability of biotechnological inventions in international conventions
In this part of the study, international regulations on the patentability will be 
discussed. In this context, The European Patent Convention and The Agreement 
on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights are important for regu-
lating general criteria for patentability and its exceptions. Directive on the Legal 
Protection of Biotechnological Inventions is especially related to the subject of our 
study by regulating the general rules and exceptions of the patentability of stem 
cells.
The European Patent Convention [22] (Convention) makes giving valid 
patents in the state parties possible. Although there is no specific regulation on 
the patentability of biotechnological inventions, it is possible to conclude by 
analyzing its general provisions. To an invention is patentable in the context of the 
Convention, it should have the criteria of novelty, inventiveness, and applicability 
in industry. In the article 53 of the Convention, the unpatentable inventions are 
counted. According to article 53/a the patent protection cannot be provided to the 
inventions which violate ordre public and morality. In the article 53/b, it is regu-
lated that the patent protection cannot also be provided to “plant or animal variet-
ies or essentially biological processes for the production of plants or animals”. Finally, 
according to the article 53/c European patents cannot be granted to “methods for 
treatment of the human or animal body by surgery or therapy and diagnostic methods 
practiced on the human or animal body”.
The Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights 
(TRIP’s) is another international agreement on patentability. In the article 27 
of TRIP’s limits for the patentability of inventions are regulated. The article is 
important for having wide coverage for the protection granted with patentability. 
According to the article, nearly all inventions, without considering its place, its 
ability to export or its technological area, are patentable and thereby they can be 
released into commercial circulation like the other trade objects. However, there are 
some exceptions to this wide regulation, too. The most important exception which 
is also essential for the biotechnological inventions is “ordre public and morality”. 
This regulation of the TRIP’s has parallels with article 53 of the Convention. Both 
regulations need reconsidering because the concepts of ordre public and morality 
are open to interpretation. In this interpretation biotechnological developments 
should also be considered [15].
Another international agreement in which the patentability of biotechnologi-
cal researches and especially stem cells are regulated in Directive 98/44/EC of The 
European Parliament and of The Council of 6 July 1998 on The Legal Protection of 
Biotechnological Inventions (Directive). The Directive is criticized for including 
uncertainties and gaps. The Directive’s attribution of being blocked off in a matter of 
confliction in which it should be clarified causes difficulties in interpretation. For this 
reason, modern technologies and necessities should contribute to the interpretation 
of the Directive.
The term “biotechnology” which appears in the title of the Directive and 
constitutes its target means, application of industrial and commercial processes 
on a biological material (living cells and microorganisms) with scientific methods. 
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This definition matches up with the definition in article 2 of the United Nations 
Convention on Biological Diversity [23] dated 1992. Because the investments in the 
field of biotechnology have high risks, the investors and owners of the inventions 
need to have legal protection and the preventions against them to be removed. So, 
the target is regulating the limitations on biotechnological material, especially on 
scientific researches related to the human body; not constituting a new and special 
kind of patent for the field of biotechnology. By regulating the limitations, it is 
aimed at both supporting biotechnological developments and reaching a level of 
development proper to public order and morality which is regulated in domestic 
and international regulations [24].
In the Directive, while the prohibited and conditioned subjects are determined, 
it is also regulated whether biotechnological inventions are patentable or not. 
According to article 3(2) of the Directive, biological materials are patentable if they 
are isolated from their natural environment. The article regulates that, “The human 
body, at the various stages of its formation and development, and the simple discovery of 
one of its elements, including the sequence or partial sequence of a gene, cannot constitute 
patentable inventions”. However in the second paragraph of the same article says 
that “an element isolated from the human body or otherwise produced by means of a 
technical process, including the sequence or partial sequence of a gene, may constitute 
a patentable invention, even if the structure of that element is identical to that of a 
natural element”. According to article 6 of the Directive,
“1.  Inventions shall be considered unpatentable where their commercial exploitation 
would be contrary to ordre public or morality; however, exploitation shall not be 
deemed to be so contrary merely because it is prohibited by law or regulation.
2.  On the basis of paragraph 1, the following, in particular, shall be considered 
unpatentable:
a. processes for cloning human beings;
b. processes for modifying the germ line genetic identity of human beings;
c. uses of human embryos for industrial or commercial purposes;
d.  processes for modifying the genetic identity of animals which are likely to 
cause them suffering without any substantial medical benefit to man or 
animal, and also animals resulting from such processes.”
As it is seen, ordre public and morality are also regulated in the Directive as 
limits of patentability of biotechnological inventions. Cloning human beings, 
modifying the germ line genetic identity of human beings, uses of human embryos 
for industrial or commercial purposes, and modifying the genetic identity of 
animals are accepted to be out of the patent protection.
The problem in the patentability of HESCRs is the Directive’s tendency to use the 
term “human embryo”. However, the term “human embryo” is not defined in the 
Directive. This situation causes the term human embryo to be widely interpreted as 
if it is the same thing with pluripotent cells of the human embryo. In fact, embryonic 
stem cells are “pluripotent” cells, which means, they are, technically, differentiable 
into a wide range of cell and tissue types [1]. However, they are not “totipotent” cells. 
A basic meaning of this fact is: They cannot differentiate into a human embryo; they 
can only differentiate into specific types of cells and tissues [5]. So, in the HESCRs 
pluripotent stem cells are used, processed, and human embryonic stem cell lines are 
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produced. Neither pluripotent stem cells nor the human embryonic stem cell lines 
are the same thing with human embryos. Besides, it is not possible for both of them 
to be used for producing or cloning human embryos. Pretending as if they are the 
same thing with the human embryos causes the patentability of human embryonic 
stem cell lines to be trapped into the discussion of the destruction of human embryos 
for research purposes which is another, but not the same, side of the story. As it is 
seen, when the knowledge learned with modern technology is not gathered with 
the regulations written before by the way of interpretation, the regulations cannot 
succeed in their aims.
As an example of the problem mentioned above, the European Court of Justice 
has decided in its Oliver Brüstle v Greenpeace eV. case (dated 18.10.2011, numbered 
c-34/10) that an application is unpatentable by interpreting the term of human 
embryo widely, in the context of article 6(2)c of the Directive. When the case is 
analyzed, it is seen that the Court has considered the principle of human dignity 
and the prohibition of commercial use in its decision. However, interpreting every 
patent application related to HESCRs within the contexts of human dignity and 
commercial use would cause a broad interpretation which is contrary to the aim of 
the Directive. Surely, human dignity is a fundamental principle, which should be 
considered in every legislating and interpreting process and the Directive serves 
for human dignity with all of its existence. However, both the Directive and the 
other international regulations on the matter also aim to support the researches to 
find treatments for severe and life quality reductive diseases such as Alzheimer’s, 
pancreas cancer, blindness, and Parkinson’s. For this reason, terms like human 
dignity, human embryo, or commercial use should not be interpreted in a way to 
cause go far from the total target. Preventing inventions with cruel commercial and 
industrial purposes and presentation of such inventions to the use is a noble cause 
which should be granted with legal regulations. However, steps to this cause should 
not be stopped from preventing human suffering. HSCRs need large amounts 
of economic resources. In order to that economical resources are granted, and 
researches are developed, patents are very important. The fact that an invention 
has an economical value should not shadow its necessity for the sake of human-
kind. However, to maintain the necessities of human dignity, the opportunity for 
each human being to reach such inventions in an equal way should be granted in 
the legal regulations.
3.3  The effect of the protection of the absolute rights on the patentability of the 
HESCLs
The sui generis legal status of human embryo basis on the characteristics of the 
ability to develop into a living human being, a person [4]. Because of this sui generis 
legal status and developments in science and medicine especially in the field of stem 
cell science, new interpretations on the right to property appeared. According to 
such interpretations, it is possible to provide human embryos the protection of both 
personal rights and the right to property. Providing the protection of the right to 
property besides the protection of personal rights do not decrease the legal status 
of the human embryo that of the property [4, 25]. On the contrary, providing extra 
protection increases the legal status of the human embryo [26, 27]. However, if 
these cells will be used as a continuation tool of the donor’s personality with the 
assisted reproductive technologies’ help it is better not to entitle them the legal 
status of the property [25]. In order to the subject of patentability of HESCRs is 
understand better, in this part of the study we will clarify the terms of personal 
rights and right to property, which are the branches of the absolute rights, the 
subjects of these rights, and the necessities of these rights for the patentability.
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Absolute rights are the rights that give its owner the broadest power over the 
owner’s own personality and the property they are subject to. Everyone must 
respect these rights and obey the limits drawn by them. In this respect, absolute 
rights are powerful rights that can be claimed against every third person. Personal 
rights are a type of absolute rights, which arise from being a person and they are a 
tool for the protection of the human embryo. With these rights, which cannot be 
waived, transferred be converted into money and can only be subject to a claim for 
compensation in case of violation, it is desired to protect the person’s material and 
moral existence.
As it is mentioned before, HESCs are body parts that can be departed from the 
body and they include their donors’ personal data. For this reason, personal rights 
of the donors’ need to be protected in the HESCRs. It is important to protect the 
personal data with personal rights against the interventions of the third parties. In 
his scope, personal data of the donors are under the protection against revealment 
and unauthorized use with the domestic and international regulations. Oviedo 
Convention [28] is a good example for such international regulations. According to 
article 5 of the Oviedo Convention;
“An intervention in the health field may only be carried out after the person 
concerned has given free and informed consent to it.
This person shall beforehand be given appropriate information as to the purpose 
and nature of the intervention as well as on its consequences and risks.
The person concerned may freely withdraw consent at any time.”
Article 22 of the Convention is also important for the subject of this study. 
According to the article 22, “When in the course of an intervention any part of a 
human body is removed, it may be stored and used for a purpose other than that for 
which it was removed, only if this is done in conformity with appropriate information 
and consent procedures.” If we interpret the articles for the case of HESCRs, we can 
say that before the human embryo is or the ova and sperms to constitute the human 
embryo are taken from the donors, the informed consent of the donors should be 
taken. The informed consent should include the purpose, process, and possible 
conclusions of the intervention. If the purpose of the intervention was, for example, 
treatment of assisted reproduction but the purpose has changed after having 
surplus embryos and the experts are willing to use the surplus embryos for HESCRs, 
they should take a new informed consent from the donors and clear the target, pro-
cess and possible conclusions of their new purpose, too. As it is seen, it is not pos-
sible to accept the patent application for HESCRs if the application includes HESCs 
that is taken without the donor’s informed consent. And if such research is done, the 
personal data of the donor will be protected with his/her personal rights [29].
As the personal rights of a person are protected against the interventions of the 
third parties, they are also protected from the person’s him/herself. The inalien-
able characteristic of personal rights requires the prevention of gaining economic 
benefits from the human body parts by the rule of the prohibition of financial gain. 
As it is mentioned above, it is not possible for a person to sell his/her body parts for 
research and therefore, such research would be unpatentable. Human body parts of 
the donors- for our case of study their human embryos or HESCs- are protecting 
as being their personal data with their personal rights. The restriction of having 
financial gain from the person’s own body parts is a necessity of human dignity.
The right to property is also claimed to be a tool for protecting departed human 
body parts. The right to property is one of the absolute rights. Absolute rights can 
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be divided into two, such as; absolute rights on tangible properties and absolute 
rights on abstract entities. Absolute rights on tangible properties are rights that give 
its owner direct control over the property and such rights can be claimed against 
everyone. Absolute rights on the abstract entities are defined as intellectual property 
rights. The intellectual property rights are the rights of individuals regarding their 
thoughts, intelligence, knowledge, and feelings. They are the rights of the products in 
the field of art, literature, law, or science. Such a right to property is not constituted 
on the product, it is directed on the intellectual property which has a legal entity 
independent of the product itself. Both property rights on the tangible properties and 
the intellectual property rights provide a superior power of protection to its owner. 
In the HESCRs, the object of the patent application, the object that the right to 
property is wanted to be constituted on, is not the body part of the donor. The object 
of the patent application to which the protections of the right to patent is wanted 
to be granted is the method or the HESCL which is produced as a conclusion of the 
application of the method. So, it is not possible to the right to property is constituted 
on a body part. Besides, HESCs themselves is not patentable since such an object of 
the patent application would not have the criteria of novelty and inventiveness. The 
thing that makes HESCs patentable is the technic, the scientific method applied to it.
It is possible to mention intellectual property rights in the patentability of 
the methods of the HESCRs. However, in the patentability of the HESCLs, since 
the object of the patent application is the stem cell line which is produced as the 
consequence of the research, a property right on the tangible properties should be 
mentioned. While the right to the property gives several rights to its owner, it also 
imposes several obligations. In this scope, the kinds of embryonic stem cells that 
the right to property can be constituted, the techniques that can be patented, and 
the ways that the patents can be used should be evaluated under the obligations 
imposed by the right to property. One of the obligations imposed by the right to 
property and thus the patent is that a legal act contrary to ordre public and morality 
should not be protected by the legal system. For this reason, with this obligation 
imposed by the right to property, the patent owner cannot act against human 
dignity while exercising his/her rights [29].
To sum up, HESCs, which are a kind of body parts that can be departed from 
the body, can be protected with both personal rights and the right to property. The 
protection granted with personal rights is for the favor of donors. This protection 
appears by both taking their informed consent and prohibiting the financial gain. 
However, the right to property is for the favor of the owner of the invention. With 
the right to property of the owner of the invention, the technique he/she applies on 
the HESCs and/or the HESCLs produced as the consequence of the technique are 
protected. So, the object which provides financial gain and the right to property will 
be constituted on is the technique of the owner of the invention and/or the HESCLs 
produced as a consequence of the technique. Another value that should be consid-
ered is the principle of human dignity. It is possible to prevent the patent applica-
tions contrary to human dignity, with the restrictions provided by the personal 
rights and obligations imposed by the right to property. By giving the patent right 
for the HESCRs, this researches will have economic support, which will help the 
development of science. This way, there will be an opportunity to find and develop 
the treatments of severe human diseases.
4. Ethical/moral discussions on the patentability of the HESCLs
Ethical debates on both HESCRs and the patentability of the HECSLs find 
their basis in the debate on the legal/moral status of the embryo. We have mainly 
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discussed the approaches to the legal status of the embryo in the first part of the 
study. The subject of legal status of the human embryo is mostly related to the 
ethical questions that arise due to the destruction of the embryo by HESCRs. In this 
part of the study, we will first consider ethical debates on stem cell discussions in 
general and then ethical debates on the patentability of the HESCLs based on these 
discussions.
The basis of the views which claim that HESCRs are unethical is the acceptance 
that the embryo is a part of human development. According to such views, embryo 
stage, which is a part of human development such as the stages of fetus, baby, child, 
old age, is also a humanbeing and is under the protection of human rights. Using 
the human embryo to treat diseases is the instrumentalization of humans. However, 
human should be an end, not a tool. This view may be called as “nongradualist 
position” [30].
It is clearly seen that the Kantian understanding of morality underlies this view. 
According to this, human beings are dignified and have certain rights due to their 
potential to be an intelligent and autonomous creature [31]. For the same reason, 
the embryo deserves the protection of human rights due to its potential to be a 
creature with intelligence and autonomy, just like other people who are lack of intel-
ligence and autonomy. This view, in the discussion of Kantian moral philosophy, 
which will be discussed below, adopts the idea that the embryo does not have to 
have reason and autonomy, therefore, having this potential is sufficient to benefit 
from the protection of human rights [32].
The second argument in the debate about the status of the human embryo is that 
the human embryo is a creature to be protected and respected, but does not have the 
quality of a fully developed baby. The moral status of the embryo increases with its 
development. Once formed, it gains the right to be protected as a human and to have 
rights. In this mode of understanding, the moral status of the embryo is not absolute 
but related to other moral elements. So it is at a relative level. When it comes to the 
possibility and benefit of other people’s treatment, the moral status of the embryo 
at a certain stage of development is decided by comparing it with this benefit. If the 
benefit to be achieved is a state of “goodness” that is superior to the destruction of 
the embryo, then destroying the embryo is not considered wrong. This argument 
provides an ethical opportunity for HESCRs [33].
Another question that needs to be answered after the question of whether the 
human embryo has the right to life is whether the human embryo is a carrier of 
human dignity. The main issue here is whether it is possible to talk about human 
dignity where there is no human life. For example, if we do not accept the embryo’s 
right to life, will we be able to honor it? In the doctrine, it was argued that the right 
to life and human dignity should be evaluated separately. It has been determined 
that there is human dignity wherever there is human life, but it cannot be said that 
there is no human dignity where there is no human life. However, the reason why 
the human embryo is honored here is because the dignity of the potential future 
person is preserved [34].
In another view, which describes the relationship between human rights  
and human dignity in a similar way and is based on the idea that the right to life 
and human dignity can exist independently, a distinction is made between respect 
for human life and the right to life with regard to the status of surplus human 
embryos. The human embryo is respected in terms of respect for human life. The 
right to life, on the other hand, is evaluated independently of this respect and is 
recognized gradually depending on passing certain stages. The result of this is 
that in some cases the general well-being outweighs the respect for the life of the 
human embryo. However, according to this opinion, the fact that the embryo can 
be sacrificed for the good of the society does not mean that the human embryo 
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is not honored. Even if the human embryo does not have the right to life, it has 
honor. This view is based on the assumption that the benefit of humanity is 
superior to respect for the life of the human embryos that will be destroyed under 
any circumstances and is criticized by its opponents as being consequential [35]. 
This view has also been criticized for its contradiction. It was stated that if the life 
of the embryo is respected, human rights should be given to it. It has been argued 
that the solution to this complicated issue would only be possible if the in vitro 
fertilization method is limited with fertilizing the OVAs that will be transferred 
to the uterus. Only in this case the human embryo is not instrumentalized and 
human dignity will be preserved [36], which is not possible for the current level of 
development of the assisted reproductive techniques.
John Harris, on the other hand, argues that the embryos that occur due to 
the in vitro fertilization method or miscarriages should be used instead of being 
wasted. He bases this thesis in the “Waste Prevention Principle”. The other option, 
which is wasting the resources, argues that there are very strong moral reasons for 
using these resources for a useful purpose. He states that if the surplus embryos 
are already going to be destructed, it is not wrong to use them for a good purpose. 
He goes one step further and claims that organ transplantation from a fetus sub-
jected to abortion is not different from organ and tissue transplantation from a 
cadaver [37].
Among the views which claim that HESCRs are supportable, there is another 
view that refers to the fact that the right to life is not an absolute right and that 
restrictions can be placed on this right in order to find treatment for incurable 
diseases. The basis of this view is the acceptance that the human embryo is a human 
and has the right to life. The view suggests that there is a conflict of interests 
between the right to life of the human embryo and patients seeking for treatment 
and in this conflict of interests finding treatment for severe diseases can be  
preferred [38].
The topic is getting a little more complicated in therapeutic cloning. Because, 
unlike the case of harvesting HESCs from surplus human embryos, in the thera-
peutic cloning the human embryos are created only for the purpose of harvesting 
HECSs. While the using surplus human embryos derived from the in assisted 
reproductive treatments is still discussive, it is claimed in the doctrine that creating 
embryos only to use them for therapeutic HESCRs or treatments of patients is much 
more problematic in the ethical aspect. In the initial phase of this technique, the 
nucleus removed from the patient is transferred to the OVA and a human embryo is 
created. The created human embryo however, is not transferred to the uterus and is 
used to obtain HESCs. Since the embryo has nearly the same genetic characteristics 
with the patient who will benefit from the HESCs, it is used in the treatment of 
the patient’s diseases and in the process of organ formation for transplantation to 
the patient. The main problem in therapeutic cloning is that the human embryo 
is formed to be destroyed for the treatment of another person’s diseases. In other 
words, the human embryo is produced to be destroyed for the benefit of another 
person or society.
According to the views that oppose to the therapeutic cloning technique, even 
if it has a therapeutic aim, this technique makes the embryo only a tool for the 
treatment of another person, and moreover, to know that the embryo will be 
destroyed at the very beginning of this process means the denial of any value of 
human life and accordingly the violation of human dignity [36]. As mentioned 
earlier, it has been suggested that the embryo can be attributed to pre-life dignity 
from the view of it has a potential to become a fully developed human being. 
However, in cloning for therapeutic purposes, the human embryo will not be able 
to benefit from honor protection retrospectively as the human embryo was not 
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created to become a human being. In other words, since the human embryo does 
not have the characteristics of a fully developed human being, its dignity will not 
be violated [39]. In this context, we need to evaluate whether the embryo is digni-
fied or not according to Kant’s ethics, which is our mainstay of human dignity. 
First of all, it has been claimed that making a differentiation between human 
dignity and the right to life made in German Law in order to protect dignity in 
terms of embryos and the dead was incompatible with Kant’s understanding of 
human dignity [40].
The view of the human embryo does not have human dignity is referred to by 
many authors by referencing the views of Kant. According to this, it is said that 
the embryo should not be honored as it does not have the characteristics of being 
self-aware, taking responsibility for its actions, acting independently, based on 
Kant’s grounding of human dignity within the framework of moral autonomy. 
However, this view was opposed, and it was argued that Kant did not connect 
human dignity to actions and fulfillment of these acts. According to Kant, anyone 
who has the capacity to act morally should be considered as an honored person in 
an experimental manner. Every human being has the capacity to take moral action 
that comes from being human. In Kantian ethics, human dignity is a concept which 
belongs to the imaginable world (the universe of noumens). Since honor belongs to 
the imaginable world and has a super-experimental quality, criteria such as brain 
activity belongs to the world of phenomena (universe of phenomena), life capacity 
outside the mother’s womb should not be taken into account. The embryo should 
be dignified from the moment of fertilization. According to this view, although the 
human embryo cannot use its capacity to act morally, it has been said that it should 
be regarded as an honored person because it has this ability [40, 41].
However, in the doctrine, there are views which also claim that it should be dis-
cussed briefly whether therapeutic cloning is an ethically problematic technique or 
not because finding treatments for severe human diseases is also a noble aim which 
serves to the human dignity. According to this view, in the therapeutic cloning, it is 
aimed to create a somatic cell or tissue type from another somatic cell. The fact that 
a step for this method is creating a human embryo and destroy it to harvest HESCs 
should not affect the whole purpose in a bad way. The created human embryo was a 
somatic cell which is processed to become another human cell, tissue or organ type, 
which means it was never going to be a fully developed human being. Indeed, the 
hope for finding and developing treatments for severe human diseases is an impor-
tant and unignorable necessity. For this reason therapeutic cloning technique which 
is legally accepted in some states such as United Kingdom and Holland deserves to 
be discussed without pretending as if it is the same thing with reproductive cloning 
which aims to produce human beings [42].
When the human dignity is violated is another point that should be mentioned. 
Human dignity becomes meaningful as an absolute law, as the human beings see 
themselves as an end and treat all other people in the same way. It goes beyond 
trends, personal qualities and acquires a universal quality. Just as we cannot hold 
the person who is used as a tool legally responsible for a passive act carried out by 
destroying his will over another; likewise, we cannot hold people responsible for 
their actions against their wills. Conversely, man is responsible for what he does, not 
what he suffers. However, by acting contrary to the value of her/his own species, 
of which a she/he is a member, she/he can act inappropriate to her/his own human 
dignity. The prerequisite for being understood with human dignity and its being so 
valuable seems to be protected by a good understanding of this value and thus by 
considering it with this understanding and valuing it at least as much as the value it 
finds in its own person. In this context, any interference with the possible right to 
life of the embryo, regardless of whether it human dignity or not, can be regarded 
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as a behavior that violates human dignity if it can be considered as a behavior 
contrary to the value of the species of which a human being is a member.
All these debates also constitute the basis for the debate on the patentability of 
the stem cell. According to our point of view, it would be appropriate to evaluate the 
ethical discussions about patentability of the HESCLs in the same way the discus-
sions on HESCRs are evaluated. So it would be meaningful to divide the topic of 
patentability of the HESCLs into two such as the patent applications that use surplus 
human embryos for their methods and the patent applications that create human 
embryos for their methods.
The first criticism of the patenting of HESCLs is that the human embryo has 
been instrumentalized, made into something tradable and of commercial value, 
just like the HESCRs. However, as mentioned in the previous sections, the subject 
of the patent is not the human embryo or HESC itself, but the processed state of the 
HESCs taken from in. In other words, it is not possible to patent the human embryo.
This criticism should be considered separately in terms of the therapeutic clon-
ing method, which includes the process of destroying the human embryo produced 
for the treatment of another person. As it will be remembered, this method was 
subject to heavy criticism that the human embryo, which has a life potential, 
would be instrumentalized in the production process, since human embryos were 
produced for the treatment of another person. If this view will be supported, the 
criticism that the human embryo is instrumentalized in the whole process in which 
it is already known that the human embryos will be used for therapeutic purposes 
and will be subject to patents after some procedures in which the stem cell in the 
human embryo is taken and subjected to a certain stage of this treatment would 
seem meaningful. When this point of view is accepted, developing a moral argu-
ment to meet the criticisms becomes striking.
On the other hand, considering the arguments for the ethical acceptability of 
HESCs, it becomes difficult to argue that patentability is a tool for instrumental-
ization. This will be the case especially for surplus human embryos or the human 
embryos with low result which are derived as a result of the application of assisted 
reproductive treatments. As stated above, within the framework of the principle 
that Harris named as the “Principle of Prevention of Waste”, it is possible to say 
that the destruction of the human embryos that will already be destroyed for a 
good purpose such as treatment cannot be different from the organ transplantation 
from a patient with brain death. Here, the debate of whether instrumentalization 
by patenting would be possible will come to the fore, since it will not be possible to 
instrumentalize the human embryo with stem cell studies alone.
It will be better to emphasize once again that it would not be correct to consider 
the inventions to be made thanks to stem cells obtained by this method as if it is the 
same thing with the patenting of the human embryo. In our opinion, the human 
embryo is not suitable for patenting on its own. Its moral/legal status does not allow 
it. Just like organ donation, the human embryo should only be offered by donation, 
and it should be prohibited to sell it for financial gain. However, it is also clear that 
using surplus embryos for therapeutic purposes is a morally supportable way. For 
this reason, the use of surplus human embryos to find new treatment is morally 
acceptable, and should be encouraged and facilitated.
The fact that HESCRs are highly expensive should also be considered. The 
sustainability of these studies despite this cost depends only on the fact that some 
financial gains can be obtained thanks to the inventions that will emerge as a result 
of these studies. If this opportunity is not provided, these studies can be carried 
out in an extremely narrow and barren framework. By considering this point, it 
seems appropriate to provide the financial support required for the continuation of 
these researches and treatments, which serve a great purpose such as the benefit of 
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humanity, through patents. However, since the issue of patenting stem cell studies 
is an issue that directly affects human life in many ways, just like organ transplanta-
tion, every stage should be handled with sensitivity and all kinds of abuse should be 
prevented. For this reason, a condition of patentability will be that the works to be 
carried out are in accordance with public order and ethical principles. In addition, 
prescribing appropriate restrictions, will prevent violation and abuse of rights.
5. Conclusion
As it is seen, misunderstanding the term of human embryonic stem cell line 
and pretending as if it is the same thing with human embryo that has a potential 
to become a human being causes it to be understood as an unpatentable value. 
Likewise, interpreting the right to property in its traditional definition causes 
biotechnological inventions to have difficulties to succeed the criteria of patent-
ability. However, developments in the medicine and science, the need for treatment 
for the severe human diseases, and the high costs of the human embryonic stem cell 
researches make the patent protection a necessity for the human embryonic stem 
cell lines. So, modern interpretations for fundamental rights and principles and new 
regulations on the biotechnological inventions become a need for such researches to 
be made and researchers to be supported for finding and developing treatments.
For a view in the doctrine, which we are agree with, providing the protection of 
the right to property to the human embryos is possible and it does not mean that 
human embryo is in the low status of a property. The sui generis legal status of 
the human embryo needs a sui generis protection. According to our point of view, 
providing the protection of both the personal rights of the donor and the right to 
property of the owner of the invention does not reduce the legal/moral status of 
the human embryo. On the contrary, providing extra protection is a proof for its 
high moral/legal status. Thanks to the obligations the personal rights impose its 
owner, the donors cannot have financial gain from selling their human embryos. 
And thanks to the obligations the personal rights impose to the third parties, 
the researchers cannot use the human embryos without their informed consent. 
Otherwise sanctions of private and criminal law appears because of the violation of 
personal rights based on the protection of the personal data of the donors and the 
research and it consequences become unpatentable. The same situation also appears 
with the right to property and accordingly patentability. Thanks to the prohibiton 
of having financial gain from the human body and its parts, a researcher cannot 
patent the human embryo or human embryonic stem cell. The researcher has to 
find a novel, inventive, and industrially applicable method for producing human 
embryonic stem cell lines or invent a new method for a treatment. The owner of 
the patent is restricted with both the criteria of patentability and the principle 
of human dignity. By this way owner of the patent right is supported for making 
expensive and difficult inventions for the human diseases to be treated and has to 
do it appropriately to the personal rights of the donor, criteria of patentability and 
the principle of human dignity.
Novel Perspectives of Stem Cell Manufacturing and Therapies
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